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After the 51-48 defeat of the CTBT in the Senate, the 
National Academy of Sciences was commissioned by 
General John Schalikashvili (Former Chair, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff) to examine technical issues relating to the CTBT. The 
issues reviewed in this paper are as follows: 
Verification: Seismic monitoring of tamped, underground 
nuclear explosions with the International Monitoring System is 
better than what was originally stated (1 kton), to about 0.1 kton. 
When the NAS panel took all the factors into account by the NAS, 
muffled explosions detonated in cavities can be detected down to 
1~2 kton. The advent of interferometric synthetic aperture radar 
compliments the CTBT monitoring technologies (seismic, 
infrasound, hydroacoustic, radionuclide) and NTM methods 
by measuring surface subsidence to 0.1 cm.
Stockpile Stewardship: All scientific review groups agree 
that nuclear testing is not needed at this time, and the NAS 
concludes that it is unlikely to be needed in the future. 
Plutonium decay in the primary stage does not greatly 
limit the Pu pit lifetime, which NNSA determined to be a 
minimum of  45~60 years .  The most  l ikely  weapon 
components to suffer degradation are the non-nuclear com-
ponents, which can be monitored without the need of nuclear 
testing.
Benefits of Cheating: After an evaluation of the weapons 
programs of other nations, the NAS concluded that “Very 
little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed CTBT 
regime would be lost in the case of clandestine testing 
within the considerable constraints imposed by the available 
monitoring capabilities… The worst-case scenario under a 
no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to U.S. security - 
sophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many, more 
adversaries - than the worse-case scenario of clandestine 
testing in a CTBT regime, without the constraints posed by 
the monitoring system.”
1. CTBT in Context
Building on the experience of three previous nuclear 
testing treaties (1), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) bans all nuclear tests of any yield in all places for 
all time. This requires the fulfillment of complete bans in 
terms of four parameters (number, yield, location and time). 
The CTBT is an arms control measure that constrains the 
five nuclear weapons states from developing new weap-
ons. In the past, the US tested the most at 1,030 times, 
followed by the Former Soviet Union with 715 tests, which 
is much more than the tests of other states; France (210), 
UK (45) and China (45), as well as India and Pakistan 
at about five each. The CTBT is also a nonproliferation 
measure since the test ban raises a barrier to the develop-
ment of first-time nuclear weapons. The 1998 tests by 
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non-NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferat ion Treaty) part ies, 
India and Pakistan, highlighted the need for a universally 
accepted CTBT and NPT. The CTBT also affects the 
long-term stability of the NPT. The agreement by the five 
nuclear weapon states (China, France, RF, UK, US) to 
join the CTBT was the quid pro quo accepted by the five 
nuclear weapon states in 1996 to gain the acceptance by 183 
non-nuclear weapon states to extend the NPT for all time. The 
Council  of  the American Physical  Society approved 
statements strongly supporting the CTBT on April 19, 1997 
and April 4, 2003 (2).
The CTBT has been signed by 169 nations (Decem-
ber 2003), which amounts to all  the nuclear capable 
nations, except for India, Iraq, and Pakistan (North Korea has 
announced that it possesses nuclear weapons and it has 
been widely reported that Israel also has a stock). Of the 
signatory nations, 107 have ratified the CTBT, including three 
nuclear weapons states (Russia, France, United Kingdom). In 
October 1999, the US Senate rejected the CTBT by a vote of 51 
to 48. (China stated it will ratify the CTBT only after the US 
ratifies it.) After the defeat of the CTBT, the National Academy of 
Sciences was asked by the Clinton administration to convene a 
panel of experts (3) to examine technical issues that could affect 
the viability of a test ban. The results of the NAS study, Technical 
Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
were published in 2002 (4). The Academy decided early on not to 
evaluate the net benefit of the CTBT to the United States, 
but rather the NAS examined the following three technical 
issues:
• ability to monitor a test ban, including evasion scenarios.
• US capacity to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile 
  without testing.
• ability of nations to increase nuclear prowess by cheating 
  and its effect on US security.
NPT-CTBT Connection. As stated above, the non-nuclear 
weapons states view the CTBT as the quid pro quo that fulfills the 
requirement of the five nuclear weapons states to balance their 
CTBT obligations to the 183 non-nuclear weapon states. This 
balancing act was very apparent to the 5 nuclear weapon states in 
1996. The NPT would not have been renewed by the 183 states for 
all time, without a time limit, unless all five nuclear weapon states 
declared they would join the CTBT. The continuation of 
the NPT is of fundamental importance to all nations, as it 
is the legal capstone that constrains the nuclear rogue states 
(President Clinton) and the axis of evil (President George W. 
Bush). On December 8, 2003 the General Assembly of the 
United Nations passed a resolution that urged all nations to 
maintain the nuclear testing moratorium, urged all nations 
to sign the CTBT and urged all nations that had signed the 
CTBT to ratify it. The gap between the US and the rest of the 
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which agrees with calculations from the national laboratories 
and universities. The limit of 0.1 kton for tamped explosions is 
a factor of ten better than the 1 kton limit that was originally 
projected for the IMS. Even this estimate can be too cautious 
in that it does not take into account the possibility of close-
in, regional stations. A concerned state could place regional 
seismographs close to a suspected region to improve 
monitoring. Finally, chemical explosions are usually iden-
tifiable as they are not spherical explosions, but they are 
often ripple-fired along a line to reduce costs. The required 
notification threshold for chemical explosions is 0.3 kton, 
which reduces suspicions about chemical explosions.
Fig. 1. IMS seismic monitoring limit (tons). Projected 
90%-probable, 3-station detection thresholds in tons of 
explosive yield for the IMS network of 50 primary stations. The 
IMS detection threshold is below 0.1 kton for all of Eurasia 
and below 0.5 kton for all continents worldwide. The 1999 
IMS system with 33 stations detected 0.1 kton underground 
chemical explosions and a 0.025-kton explosion at the 
former Soviet Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. [Center for 
Monitoring Research, Nuclear Testing Programs, Department 
of Defense, in Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy of Sciences, National 
Academy Press, 2002]
Explosion in a Cavity. There are very little data on nuclear 
tests exploded in cavities. If a nuclear weapon is placed in a 
cavity of sufficient size, the blast pressure on the cavity wall 
falls below the material’s elastic limit, which avoids cracking 
and nonlinear effects, reducing the effective seismic yield by 
a theoretical factor of 7 at 20 Hz and 70 at lower frequencies. 
The only fully decoupled test took place in 1966 when the 
0.38-kton Sterling explosion was exploded in a Mississippi salt 
cavity with a 17-m radius (from the 5.3-kton, Salmon 
explosion); it minimized the observed yield by, at most, a factor of 
70. The Soviets carried out a 9-kton test in a cavity at Azgir 
in 1976, but it was only partially decoupled, as the weapon 
was too large for the cavity’s 36-m radius (from a 64-kton 
previous test).
If blast pressure exceeds the elastic limit of the cavity’s 
wall material, sufficient energy is absorbed to crack the wall, 
increasing coupling to the wall, giving an increased seismic 
signal. Critical cavity size depends on explosion depth, but it 
is usually assumed to be about 1 km. One expects that R
c
 is 
proportional to Y1/3 since the energy to fill the volume of the 
cavity to a critical pressure is proportional to the yield, or Y α 
world could not be more apparent from the following. The vote 
in the General Assembly was 173 in favor, 1 against (U.S.) 
and four abstentions (Columbia, India, Mauritius, Syria), 
while Iraq and North Korea were absent. The intensity of the 
global diplomatic opinion on the CTBT/NPT connection is not 
understood by the US populace.
2. Monitoring the CTBT
The Senate debate on the CTBT was marred by claims that 
cheating could take place without detection at yields up to 70 
kilotons. The NAS report strongly contradicts this claim. 
The CTBT Organizat ion’s  Internat ional  Monitor ing 
System (IMS) deploys 300 monitoring stat ions that 
use seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, or infrasound 
sensors. These facilities are operating today without the CTBT 
having entered into force. The IMS network consists of 50 
primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations. In addition the 
IMS deploys 60 infrasound stations (less than 0.5-kton global 
a tmospheric  threshold detect ion) ,  11 hydroacoust ic 
stations (less than 100-kg global oceanic detection) 
and 80 radionuclide stations (less than 1-kton, global 
atmospheric detection). In addition, the US uses satellite 
optical bhangmeters, particle detectors and EMP detectors to 
monitor atmospheric tests. Lastly, US National Technical 
Means (NTM) monitors with other technologies, including 
satellite reconnaissance, human intelligence (humint) and 
other “ints.” The IMS and NTM technologies combine to make 
intelligence gathering a synergistic operation that is greater 
than the sum of its parts. The fear of being spotted by the 
IMS and NTM deters most nations from cheating, and these 
measures will be buttressed by on-site inspections. Since the 
signing of the CTBT, a potent new technology, interferometric 
synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), has been disclosed, which we 
will discuss at the end of this section.
The US, Russia and UK have only tested in underground 
locations since 1963, and they have been joined in this by 
France (1974), China (1980), India (1974, 1998) and Pakistan 
(1998). Seismographs are the primary tool for monitoring 
underground tests, with the other technologies supplementing 
this data. Seismic traces from nuclear explosions differ from 
earthquake traces in several ways. Nuclear explosion seismic 
data have higher-frequency components than those from earth-
quakes because the duration of an explosion is much shorter 
than the duration of an earthquake. In addition, the ratio of the 
short-period, pressure body wave magnitude (mb) to the long-
period, surface wave magnitude (MS), is larger for weapons 
than for earthquakes. The zero-threshold limit for the CTBT 
was chosen because a finite limit legalizes testing below that 
limit and because accurately determining a threshold adds a 
source of error (5).
The International Monitoring System (IMS) has the 
capability to detect explosions with high confidence (90% 
certainty) to an mb level of 3 (less than 2.5 for Russia’s Novaya 
Zemlya), which corresponds to a tamped explosion of about 
0.1 kton in hard rock throughout Eurasia and North Africa. The 
contours in Fig. 1 are in tons (not kilotons). These results are 
from the Defense Department’s Center for Monitoring Research, 
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P∆V α R
c
3. The critical radius for decoupling increases with 
yield to the third power, according to 
R
c
 = (15–20 meters)Y1/3,     
with Y in kton. From this, a 70-kton explosion needs a cavity 
radius of 70 m (a 20-story building) to achieve full decoupling 
– an extraordinary engineering challenge when one considers 
the secrecy requirements.
We derive the coupling constant from first principles for a 
1-kton blast in salt. Because explosion occurs very rapidly, 
little heat is transferred during the compression. This dictates 
an adiabatic expansion with PVγ= C, a constant. The yield Y 
to compress air to the elastic limit of salt is 
  Y = – P dV = – CV–γ dV = CV1–γ/(γ – 1) = P
o
(4πR
c
3/3)/ 
    (γ   – 1) = P
o
V
c
/(γ – 1),
where P
o
 is the elastic limit of the wall material and V
c
 is 
minimum cavity volume.. Using Y = 1 kton, γ = = 1.2 (very 
hot air) and P
o
 = 440 bar for salt’s elastic limit, we obtain the 
minimum cavity radius R
c
 = 16 m. The critical radius is 30 m 
at a depth of 600 m (6).
Monitoring Limit  with Cheating.  The NAS panel 
concluded that “The only evasion scenarios that need to be 
taken seriously at this time are cavity decoupling and mine 
masking.” The NAS panel considered many issues that affect 
the probability of successfully hiding a nuclear test in a cavity. 
For example, covert testing is complicated by the possibility 
of venting of radioactive gases from the explosion, which can 
easily be detected. The Soviets had 30% of its tests vent, and 
the US had severe venting problems during its first decade 
of underground testing. Venting from smaller tests is often 
harder to contain than venting from larger ones, as the last 
four US tests that vented had yields of less than 20 kilotons. 
This tendency to vent at lower yields can be explained by the 
hypothesis that smaller explosions may not sufficiently enclose 
cavities with glassified rubble, and they may not rebound 
sufficiently to seal fractures with a stress cage. The NAS panel 
considered six other issues as follows:
• Violators need to make accurate yield estimates to avoid  
  yield excursions.
• Vio la tors  need  to  h ide  removed mater ia l s  f rom 
  satellites.
• Crater and surface changes from testing are observable.
• Regional seismic signals at 10 Hz improve detection.
• A series of tests is needed to develop significant 
  weapons.
• Human and other intelligence can give information.
Because the total success probability for hiding a covert test 
is the product of the individual-task success (P
success
 = Π
i
 P
I
), 
the NAS panel did not use a decoupling factor of 70 times the 
0.1-kton limit to obtain a maximum cheating limit of 7 kton. 
Rather, it concluded the following: “Taking all these factors 
into account and assuming a fully functional IMS, we judge 
that an underground nuclear explosion cannot be confidently 
hidden if the yield is larger than 1 or 2 kton.”
Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar. Signatures from 
underground nuclear tests can be obtained using accurate 
satellite radar interferometry (7). By combining synthetic 
aperture radar data (European Space Agency) from before 
and after a nuclear test, crater subsidences as small as 0.1 cm 
can be measured. The radar data has a horizontal resolution 
of better than 10 m, which is much smaller than a typical 
crater subsidence radius of about 100 m. A typical radar frame 
covers 100 km by 100 km, sufficient to search wide areas. 
The ISAR data can also determine the slow subsidence 
relaxation over longer times. This allows ISAR to locate past 
explosion locations for which there was no radar data prior to the 
explosion. Interferometric radar has some limitations, but it 
is a very positive addition to CTBT monitoring.
3. Stockpile Stewardship
The NAS panel examined many factors in its analysis on 
the US ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapon 
stockpile without testing:
• Confidence requires a high-quality workforce and 
  adequate budgets.
• Stockpile stewardship and enhanced surveillance must  
  examine components of weapons.
• Remanufacture to original specifications is the preferred 
  remedy for age-related defects.
• A highly disciplined process is needed to install changes in 
  nuclear designs.
• Primary yield that falls below the minimum level needed 
  to drive a secondary is the most likely potential source of 
  nuclear-related degradation.
• Based on past experience, the majority of aging problems 
  will be found in the non-nuclear components, which can be 
  fully tested under a CTBT. (NNS has stated that nuclear 
  Pu pits have a minimum lifetime of 45-60 years with 
  “no life-limiting factors.”)
• In the past, confidence tests were limited to one per year, as 
  most tests were carried out to critique new designs.
• New stewardship programs, using the Dual Axis Radiographic 
  Hydro Test (DAHT) facility and Advanced Simulation  
  and Computing (ASC), are already valuable
During the technical briefings, potential problems for exist-
ing warheads (8) in the enduring stockpile were raised. The 
NNSA was asked if testing was needed to resolve these issues 
and the answer was always “no”. From all of these results, the 
Academy panel concluded the following:
“Although a properly focused stockpile stewardship 
program is capable, in our judgement, of maintaining 
the required confidence in the enduring stockpile under 
a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a capabil-
ity to certify new nuclear subsystem design for entry in the 
stockpile without nuclear testing – unless by accepting a 
substantial reduction in the confidence in weapon performance 
associated with the certification up until now, or a return 
to earlier, simpler, single stage design concepts such as 
gun-type weapons.”
“It  seems to us that  the argument to the contrary 
–  tha t  i s ,  the  a rgument  tha t  improvements  in  the 
capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of 
nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with the grow-
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ing needs from an aging stockpile – underestimates the 
current capability for stockpile stewardship, underestimates 
the effects of current and likely future rates of progress in 
improving these capabilities, and overestimates the role 
that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to 
play) in ensuring stockpile reliability.”
4. NAS Conclusion on Potential Impact of 
Foreign Testing
Section 2 of this paper showed that explosions of tamped 
weapons can be detected with high confidence in Eurasia 
for yields over 0.1 kton, and explosions in a cavity can be 
detected above 1–2 kton. What can nations learn from 
cheating at these levels? Nations with lesser prior-testing 
experience can carry out equation of state studies, high- 
explosive lens experiments, certification of bulky inefficient 
unboosted fission weapons (gun-type), one-point safety tests, 
limited improvement of unboosted fission weapons, proof 
tests of compact weapons with yields up to 1–2 kton (with 
difficulty and without an excursive yield). Nations with greater 
prior-testing nuclear test experience could partially develop 
primaries for thermonuclear weapons. The CTBT prevents 
the development of low-yield boosted fission weapons, 
and the full testing of primaries (over 1–2 kton) and ther-
monuclear weapons. The NAS study commented on what 
Russia, China and other nations could gain from cheating on 
a country-by-country basis.
Of course cheating on the CTBT would be a blow 
to the political aspects of the nonproliferation regime. 
However, the NAS panel concluded the following: “But 
potential undetected Russian and Chinese evasive testing is not 
relevant to the maintenance of US nuclear weaponry. As 
noted in Chapter 1 (on stockpile stewardship), we judge that 
the United States has the technical capability to maintain the 
reliability of its existing stockpile without testing, irrespective 
of whether Russia or China decides they need to test in order 
to maintain the reliability of theirs….”
“Very little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed 
CTBT regime would be lost in the case of clandestine testing 
within the considerable constraints imposed by the available 
monitoring capabilities. Those countries that are best able to 
successfully conduct such clandestine testing already possess 
advanced nuclear weapons of a number of types and could add 
little, with additional testing, to the threats they already pose 
or can pose to the United States. Countries of lesser nuclear 
test experience and design sophistication would be unable 
to conceal tests in the numbers and yield required to master 
nuclear weapons more advanced than the ones they could 
develop and deploy without any testing at all.”
“The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far 
bigger threats to U.S. security – sophisticated nuclear weapons 
in the hands of many more adversaries – than the worse-case 
scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, without the 
constraints posed by the monitoring system.”
* D. Hafemeister was the technical staff lead for nuclear 
testing for the State Department (1987), the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (1990ñ92) and the National Academy of 
Sciences CTBT Study (2000ñ02). dhafemei@calpoly.edu.
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